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i. Introduction 
 
In replacing the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs (GATT), the 
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) purpose was to equalize trade conditions 
and create a fairer trade environment for goods and services and the free flow 
of trade. Aligning structural imbalances in multilateral commerce in an 
asymmetrical economic environment was pivotal.  
 
For two decades, the WTO has tried to serve as an impartial forum for 
countries to negotiate. It has successfully administered a sophisticated dispute 
settlement mechanism that is its crown jewel and most notable achievement. On 
the other hand, WTO ministerial conferences are often regarded to be 
perfunctory affairs, branded as ‘house-keeping’ exercises and structured to 
disperse the more fiery aspects of multilateral politics in the trade 
environment.1  
 
The WTO, as well as any other international organization, brings many 
members who join voluntarily but have external interests that conflict. Most 
notably, the WTO is home to developed nations as well as developing countries 
– countries with unstable economic conditions that still are attractive 
economies.  
 
This paper will analyze how the WTO, in its role as a forum for trade 
                                                 
1 Wilkinson, Rorden and Hannah, Erin and Scott, James. The WTO in Bali: What MC9 Means for 
the Doha Development Agenda and Why it Matters? (February 12, 2014). Brooks World Poverty 
Institute Working Paper No. 194. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2437422 
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talks, can assist developing countries – the BRICS in particular – find progress. 
The focus will be on the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda, India’s food 
reserve policy and the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), which were 
outcomes of the Bali round of negotiations. 
 
The Uruguay Round that created the WTO left many subjects 
unanswered, especially agriculture. The attempt to subject it to disciplines 
similar to those that govern trade in manufacturing was partially successful: 
export subsidies and domestic support measures were reduced but not 
eliminated.2 Thus, Doha set out in its final agenda the need to discuss and 
develop more consensual policies. 
 
Nations have different priorities, but a sound economic environment will 
depend on strategic factors. At its core, the WTO promotes international 
welfare with a multilateral trading system. Notably, the WTO decision-making 
is unanimous. It concentrates a broad set of members with highly differentiated 
interests and needs, which brings dense political weight to the organization. 
 
In 2001, the member states reached an understanding on several aspects 
that would drive the workforce. The Doha Agenda highlighted certain 
concerns, such as agriculture subsidies, textile and clothing trade and trade 
related to intellectual property. But much of what was accomplished as agreed 
under the Doha round was slowly implemented. The “Bali Package” focuses on 
a new agreement on trade facilitation aimed at reducing bureaucracy and 
facilitating customs procedures to cut the cost of doing business. 
 
This paper examines some of the most relevant points in assessing 
economic growth: the correlation between the points in the Doha Agenda and 
the Bali Package and how this may ultimately assist in the development of 
                                                 
2 Srinivasan, T. N. Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading System After Doha. (February 
2002). Yale University Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 842. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=301394 
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developing countries and, in essence, the presence of the BRICS in international 
economy and politics. 
 
ii. The Doha Agenda 
 
The Uruguay Round took six years to be negotiated and was merely the 
kick-off for the World Trade Organization. It was foreseeable that poles and 
interest groups would form over time. The Fourth Ministerial Conference in 
Doha, Qatar, in November of 2001, saw government officials from the member 
states launch a new set of negotiations.  
 
Academic research is highly critical on what the initial goal of the 
Uruguay Round was and what it displayed as a final product. Industrial 
countries were to reduce their barriers to exports from the South, especially in 
the most important sectors, like clothing, textiles and agriculture. Despite the 
failure of the Uruguay Round to address all key points from the start, the 
coalition of countries built up a complete and extensive list of work in the Doha 
negotiations. 
 
In short, Doha aimed to eliminate distorting domestic support in 
agriculture, reduce tariffs and create a method for tariff escalation: higher tariffs 
protecting final products and lower tariffs on raw materials. Another highly 
debated factor was trade facilitation – i.e. reduction of bureaucracy easing 
customs procedure and clearance of exports and imports. Generally speaking, 
the Doha Agenda aimed to cut import taxes, restricts countries' use of subsidies 
for agriculture and lower taxes and regulatory barriers that affect the 
multilateral trading system.3 Doha produced a final declaration on intellectual 
property issues, as well as on the implementation of policies, but lacked 
conclusion on many points that sparked heated discussions.  
                                                 
3 Doha round trade talks – explainer. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2012/sep/03/doha-round-trade-talks-explainer  
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While the WTO has 160 members over its 20 years of existence, about 
two-thirds are developing economies4. The WTO is the “arbiter” of global 
trade.5 In line with the World Bank, a developing country is a country in which 
the majority of the population lives on less money and with fewer basic public 
services than persons in highly industrialized countries. While this is a broad 
definition, scholars and anyone interested in current issues are able to 
determine whether a certain country is a developed or developing nation. 
Countries with a Gross National Income (GNI) of US$ 11,905 and less are 
defined as developing.6 
 
Because developing nations have most of their population living in rural 
areas, the farming subsidies issue was critical in the Doha Round. There was 
also concern that the Doha approach was a minimalist one. The United States 
knew that it committed to offering more farm subsidy cuts. The E.U. knew it 
would need to cut down on agriculture tariffs. Large emerging countries would 
need to offer deeper industrial cuts.7 
 
Much of the skepticism to trade opening was based on the fact that 
countries tended to associate high unemployment rates with increasing trade 
liberalization. The conclusion invoked by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) and the WTO is that trade opening leads countries to seek 
to leverage where they can have a comparative advantage, and that this carries 
short-run effects in which certain sectors of the economy will endure the 
transition hardship. Studies display that, absent other reasons, liberalization 
helps raise the average trade to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio. 
 
                                                 
4 Data available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm  
5 Doha round trade talks – explainer. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2012/sep/03/doha-round-trade-talks-explainer  
6 Data available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm  
7 Charlton, Andrew. The collapse of the Doha trade round. 2006. Available at 
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/CP210.pdf  
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Figure 1  
 
Source: 
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/05/28/000442464_
20130528112411/Rendered/PDF/775730JRN020080alization0and0Growth.pdf 
 
 
Moreover, a recent study provided data that alleged that jobless rate was 
not a result of increased imports in the long run. Since 1990, the imports line 
constantly rose and diverged from a fairly constant line of unemployment rate. 
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Figure 2 
 
Source: http://www.oecd.org/site/tadicite/50258009.pdf  
 
In having evaluated mostly developed countries, the graphic might 
suggest that trade liberalization that is tied to the maintenance of effective social 
security programs may succeed to promote stable economic growth. 
Developing countries, including the BRICS, will not necessarily suffer from 
reducing local taxes on industrial products. The key factor is the maintenance of 
well-construed social policies. 
 
iii. The Bali deal 
 
Past the effect that Doha represents in the geopolitics of trade, the WTO 
has over the years played a significant role in implementing its applauded 
Dispute Resolution mechanism, its data collection expertise and review of trade 
policies. The general sense, however, is that implementation was inconsistent 
and lacked further development in the Doha Agenda. Bali was the Ninth 
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Ministerial Conference, held in December 2013, and the first one headed by the 
new Brazilian Director-General, Roberto Azevêdo.  
 
The Bali Package shows how the WTO is a helpful hand for the BRICS. 
The emergence of these new players is one of the central facets of the evolution 
currently taking place in global trade and global governance mechanisms.8 
With the Doha Round in 2001, member states declared their willingness to 
negotiate a more liberal multilateral trade regime that would make trade serve 
the development of all countries.9 But because this was only a declaration, the 
big players often diverted in different ways and negotiated regional agreements 
in their own terms.  
 
Mr. Azevêdo had been appointed to office less than three months before 
the Ninth Ministerial Conference and was conscious of the need to negotiate 
key agriculture matters. He pledged to boost world economy, adjust 
agricultural rules and aid developing countries, and to substantiate the WTO as 
a forum for trade negotiation.10 
 
As detailed in academic literature: “[i]t is precisely because agricultural 
earnings are so important to a large number of developing countries that the highly 
protective farm policies of a few wealthy countries are being targeted by them in the 
WTO negotiations. Better access to rich countries’ markets for their farm produce is a 
high priority for them.”11 At Bali, the areas of trade facilitation, food security and 
                                                 
8 Koopmann, Georg and Wittig, Stephan. Whither WTO – The Multilateral Trading System After 
Bali. Volume 49, January/February 2014, Number 1. Available at  
http://www.intereconomics.eu/archive/year/2014/1/whither-wto-the-multilateral-trading-
system-after-bali   
9 Jovanovic, Miroslav N. and Damnjanovic, Jelena. Saving Multilateralism in a Higgledy-Piggledy 
Trading System. (March 4, 2015). Journal of Economic Integration, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2015. Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2573750 
10 Azevêdo, Roberto. A Chance to Revive Multilateral Trade. December 1, 2013. Available at 
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304854804579231462468935636  
11 Anderson, Kym and Martin, Will. Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda. 
(May 2005). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3607. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=753573 
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agricultural subsidies and matters concerning the least developed countries 
(LSD) were discussed; much of the debate related to the BRICS.  
 
The BRICS are devoting time to the formation of an effective anti-cartel 
system and growing cooperation between competition authorities of the BRIC 
countries. This is why the Bali Round was fundamental in trying to solve key 
issues for the BRICS members, such as India’s agriculture and food matters as 
well as its excessive bureaucracy with the trade facilitation talks. 
 
a. Food stockpiling and subsidies – the India case 
 
Under the WTO’s rules, trade-distorting subsidies to farmers in a 
developing country cannot exceed 10% of the total value of its harvests.12 Under 
the main spotlight at Bali were the methods on how developing countries, led 
by India, dealt with food volatility as they are import sensitive. As previously 
expressed, farming is critical in developing countries, and India is heavily 
dependent on farming in order to provide employment to its people. It is 
contended that the growth of food stockholding schemes in the run-up to the 
Bali meeting was the result of the inability of WTO members to agree on 
equitable solutions for updating farm trade rules, in respect to the new market 
trends.13 Public food reserves are sometimes determinative in countries that 
frequently suffer from shortages of daily supplies, like India and other 
developing nations. 
 
India’s policies on agriculture sponsored the whole consumer chain by 
protecting farmers and distributing food to the inhabitants. The fall-out was 
close when India led the G33 group of developing countries in stating it would 
                                                 
12 Bailing out from Bali. Available at http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21611088-indias-scuppering-latest-trade-talks-leaves-no-one-better-bailing-out  
13 Matthews, Alan. Food Security and WTO Domestic Support Disciplines post-Bali. ICTSD 
Programme on Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development; Issue Paper No. 53; 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland, 
www.ictsd.org  
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pay above-market prices for stockpiled food it bought from local farmers. The 
result was a compromise by Pakistan not to challenge India’s policies for four 
years, while the member states work together in finding an adaptable solution. 
Pakistan feared India’s policy would directly affect its own local farming, but 
was persuaded by the United States to lower the tone and allow some progress 
to be made. The consensus was that by ironing out their differences on food 
stockpiling issues, negotiators paved the way for discussing other key topics. 
 
As a participant of the BRICS, India relied on the WTO mechanism to 
evidence that control of world trade is no longer in the hands of developed 
nations only. On the issue of placing the BRICS as central revolvers in 
international trade, India’s stance, while seemingly less cooperative than 
expected, represented that the WTO’s unanimous decision-making process 
adds the BRICS with huge bargaining power as development of international 
commerce continues. 
 
b. Trade Facilitation 
 
The partial agreement on the food security issue proved that, at least, the 
parties were able to decide and not go around in circles. The issue of trade 
facilitation was a long-standing issue in the WTO’s to-do list and some room 
was found to deepen it. In reaching the Trade Facilitation Agreement, the 
member states committed to the reduction of customs bureaucracy and 
promised technical cooperation with those countries most historically buried in 
burdensome red tape. The Trade Facilitation Agreement holds that support will 
be provided to assist developing countries in achieving the capacity to 
implement the necessary domestic reforms to reduce excessive filing. 14 
 
                                                 
14 Erasmus, Gerhard. The WTO Breakthrough on the Bali Package: the trade facilitation value chain 
and African integration. Available at http://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/6762-the-wto-
breakthrough-on-the-bali-package-the-trade-facilitation-value-chain-and-african-
integration.html  
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In fact, the Trade Facilitation product is, by far, the main takeaway of the 
Bali round, let alone the biggest achievement in the WTO’s existence as a 
negotiator for the poorest states. Studies suggest that moving goods more 
quickly and efficiently would carry a payoff of $1 trillion in exports gain and 
GDP increases of $ 960 billion.15 It would also create 21 million jobs, which 
directly correlates to the previously discussed idea that expanded market 
openness does not affect employment negatively if accompanied by effective 
public policies and labor regulation. The genesis of trade facilitation discussions 
in the organization was a general concern by the global community that 
inefficient border management procedures and controls increasingly impeded 
international production sharing.16 Countries fail to leverage their competitive 
advantage in production by burdening their economy with procedures and 
costs for imports. 
 
The BRICS differ greatly with respect to their trade volume. China, as the 
largest exporting emerging economy is more sensitive to tariffs and trade 
facilitation due to its large trade volume of manufactured and primary goods17. 
Large emerging economies face the same primary problem: enrooted 
bureaucracy in governmental authorities. The TFA aims to overcome these 
hitches by cutting excessive red tape at all stages of products clearance. 
   
The agreement, in this point, demonstrated a significant sensation of 
“delivery” as DG Azevêdo emphasized in the closing ceremony. In order to 
accomplish full implementation, the Trade Facilitation Agreement connects 
commitments in bureaucracy reduction to increasing the technical capacity to 
                                                 
15 Hufbauer, Gary and Schott, Jeffrey. Payoff from the World Trade Agenda 2013. Report to the ICC 
Foundation (June 14, 2013). Available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/hufbauer-
schott20130614ppt.pdf  
16 Hoekman, Bernard. The Bali Trade Facilitation Agreement and Rulemaking in the WTO: Milestone, 
Mistake or Mirage? (October 2014). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research 
Paper No. RSCAS 2014/102. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2514367 
17 Libo Wu, Xiangshuo Yin, Changhe Li, Haoqi Qian, Taoran Chen and Weiqi Tang. Trade and 
Investment Among BRICS: Analysis of Impact of Tariff Reduction and Trade Facilitation Based on 
Dynamic Global CGE Model. Available at 
 https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/6554.pdf   
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do so.  Trade facilitation measures are able to benefit all countries by allowing 
them to participate in the global value chains that feature international trade 
today.18 These provisions significantly alter the current approach to special and 
more favorable treatment for developing countries, creating an innovative 
template for future solutions.19 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
The broad opinion is that, if Doha was too wide-ranging because 
countries that arrived at the negotiation table had very distant views and lacked 
goodwill to reach a middle term, Bali was a significant step taken towards 
progress. Trade facilitation has been backed by studies showing it will 
successfully reduce money expenditure on red tape. This was a sign of a 
growing sense of cooperation.  
 
The TFA represents a major effort by member states to craft an 
agreement that extends WTO rules, in a way that addresses restrictions on the 
ability of developing countries to implement changes; it is not a utopic model 
                                                 
18 OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators: An overview of available tools. Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/tad/facilitation/tfi-overview-available-tools-2014.pdf  
19 Christophe Bellmann. The Bali Agreement: Implications for Development and the WTO. 
International Development Policy, Revue internationale de politique de développement. 
Available at http://poldev.revues.org/1744   
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distant from execution. Hoekman states that high trade costs can lock a country 
out of participation in the supply chain trade without generating benefits for 
local producers, as often there will not be local demand for the specialized 
inputs that would otherwise be imported as part of supply chain trade 
production.20 
 
However, implementation of the full agreement was initially blocked by 
India due to its desire to extend permanently its food stockpiling privileges. A 
mediated consensus that the U.S. will not challenge India’s policies reinforced 
the position of the U.S. as a contributor of “political and economic capital” – 
perpetuating the hegemonic stability theory.21 
 
c. The example of Brazil 
 
Eyeing the example of one BRICS adherent, Brazil, the TFA seems highly 
impressive and promising. Brazil’s culture has always been one of massive 
regulation on customs and administrative procedures, generating an extensive 
structuralized chain of procedures and tasks concerning import and export of 
goods. Notwithstanding the political turmoil involving the current government, 
Brazil is still, not surprisingly, a very entertaining economy. 
 
On the flipside, Brazil’s red tape is a deficient factor. Burdened by 
complicated, expensive and time-consuming measures for clearance of goods, 
various economic sectors pressured the government to lessen and quicken 
customs clearance procedures. Improved actions for compliance with Brazilian 
duties regulations could spawn yearly savings of US$ 1.5 billion as well as add 
                                                 
20 Hoekman, Bernard. The Bali Trade Facilitation Agreement and Rulemaking in the WTO: Milestone, 
Mistake or Mirage? (October 2014). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research 
Paper No. RSCAS 2014/102. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2514367 
21 Wong, Gordon. The Beginning of World Trade Disorganization. Available at 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/the-beginning-of-world-trade-disorganization  
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US$ 24 billion to Brazil’s GDP.22 The Brazilian Industry Confederation, 
furthermore, stated that the lack of smoothness and trade clearance represents 
an additional 13.04% average cost to national exports.23 
 
The country’s attack on the problem, and in response to the TFA 
commitments, was the official launch in April 2014 of Portal Único (Single 
Window), which aimed to reduce the average time to export by 38% (to 8 days 
from 13) and the average time to import by 41% (to 10 days from 17).24  
 
It is of note, as well, that Brazil’s commitments to trade facilitating 
measures can cause a general effect on the highly protectionist agricultural 
policies the country adopts. Brazil, as an economy still largely dependent on the 
export of raw materials, has a rigid legislation prohibiting the purchase of large 
plots of land by foreigners without congressional approval. Though bills of law 
propose that these restrictions should be lessened, the WTO can again be a 
useful tool for interested members that could pressure Brazilian authorities to 
ease access of foreign players to the nation’s agriculture market. In exchange, 
local producers could certainly benefit from the income of advance technology 
and diverse production techniques.   
   
d. The least-developed countries package 
 
It is worth mentioning that, under discussions at Bali, were also 
particular issues concerning least-developed nations. While this was the most 
finalized item after the end of the conference, the ease to reach consensus about 
                                                 
22 Enabling Trade: Catalysing Trade Facilitation Agreement Implementation in Brazil. Available at 
http://www.bain.com/Images/WEF_BAIN_REPORT_Enabling_Trade_TFA_Implementation_
Brazil.pdf quoting a study from Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) 
23 Portal Único pode elevar o PIB em US$ 23,8 bilhões em 2016, um acréscimo de 1,19%, aponta CNI. 
Available at  
http://www.portaldaindustria.com.br/cni/imprensa/2014/10/1,50438/portal-unico-pode-
elevar-o-pib-em-us-23-8-bilhoes-em-2016-um-acrescimo-de-1-19-aponta-cni.html  
24 Enabling Trade: Catalysing Trade Facilitation Agreement Implementation in Brazil. Available at 
http://www.bain.com/Images/WEF_BAIN_REPORT_Enabling_Trade_TFA_Implementation_
Brazil.pdf  
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it lies on the fact that most of the language in these deals contains non-binding 
engagements and political statements. It is a promise of best endeavor by 
developed nations to ease access by poorer countries to its markets. 
 
One of the main outcomes was the decision of duty-free and quota-free 
(DFQF) access of at least 97% of products originating from LDCs. There is a 
certain political context in this result. Both the developed countries and the 
larger developing countries, such as the BRICS, acknowledged the fact that 
judgment by the international community would be very harsh had no 
improvements been made in a round directed to development. Therefore, these 
decisions were easily agreed upon, particularly for their non-binding character. 
The delivery DFQF market access to LDCs as well as providing those with 
preferential rules of origin have, nevertheless, created doubts as to the actual 
positive effect they will have and how effectively it will be implemented. 
 
The “LDC package” contains a set of non-legally enforceable promises to 
fulfil commitments that were made in previous Ministerial Conferences. DFQF 
market access and preferential rules for cotton export from LDCs are part of a 
package that can, in the long term, enable African countries to develop. The 
residual, yet most relevant, direction now is towards real application of these 
measures. Successfully integrating LDCs into the world economy will mean the 
WTO is playing an increasingly more spirited role in bringing social welfare to 
populations and acting on behalf of the organization as whole. 
 
The LDC package was, after all, the least controversial of the three 
negotiation areas. But the actual developmental benefits remain questionable.25 
The Bali commitments aim that developed countries provide DFQF access of at 
least 97% to LDCs to improve their existing DFQF coverage —and to do so 
before the Tenth Ministerial Conference to be held in Nairobi, Kenya in 
                                                 
25 WTO Bali Declaration: what does it mean? Available at http://www.odi.org/comment/8056-
wto-bali-declaration-least-development-countries-trade-facilitation-agriculture-doha-round   
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December 2015. Developing countries were also encouraged to provide DFQF 
access. 
 
iv. Conclusion 
 
Bali was not a complete solution to the global multilateral trade system, 
but it proved to be fruitful success in what it proposed to discuss. Abandoning 
Doha and beginning from scratch would not have solved much, as over a 
decade of work would have been thrown away, while the same problems 
persisted. Bali was seen as a lifeline for some of the WTO’s poorest members26, 
an unexpected about-turn in the fortunes of the world trading system and the 
first bargain to have been struck since the WTO was created.27 
 
While the developed countries, such as the U.S. and the countries in E.U., 
have the company of emerging economies – such as the BRICS – in running the 
show, the WTO can benefit from being an institution which convenes meetings 
that direct the pace of new multilateral rules. The BRICS have different primary 
needs and concerns; some of them are highly dependent on agriculture – such 
as India – while others need to deeply address bureaucracy in all public 
spheres. 
 
It is pivotal to recall that the WTO has excelled in some of its functions, 
especially in promoting an efficient dispute resolution mechanism for 
controversies involving member-states. This has, in fact, enabled the BRICS to 
speak their concerns. However, the expected outcomes of a more developed 
economic system, globally speaking, that was intended from Doha never 
occurred and Bali introduced few, but noteworthy advances.  
 
                                                 
26 WTO agrees global trade deal worth $1tn. Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/business-
25274889   
27        21. Wilkinson, Rorden and Hannah, Erin and Scott, James. The WTO in Bali: What MC9 
Means for the Doha Development Agenda and Why it Matters? (2014). Brooks World Poverty Institute 
Working Paper No. 194. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2437422 
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It seems plausible that a whole section on quota-free permissions for 
exports by least developed countries, as well as a firm position by some 
countries towards India’s food reserves policies, launched a wave of goodwill 
in seeing with new eyes the needs of developing nations. On the same path, the 
trade facilitation measures demonstrated practical results, as empirical studies 
suggested huge financial gains from lighter and more expedited customs 
procedures, as well as a formal concern that developing nations need technical 
support and time to gradually implement changes which will benefit everyone. 
 
In giving India more freedom to implement and gradually change its 
food policy, the WTO provided a pathway to the negotiation of the trade 
facilitation deal. In contending a key member of the BRICS, Azevêdo and the 
U.S. participated in taking negotiations two steps further by solving one issue. 
The trade facilitation debate was underpinned with the concessions made 
under the food policy.  
 
There is much to do, though. Some concern points to the fact that India 
may try to extend the “peace clause” to be an indefinite provision. A more 
conservative understanding is that trade facilitation was a minor accessory 
bolted on to the main body of the Doha round.28  
 
The key to the WTO’s success is to put the TFA into full practice. India 
had previously intended to block the trade facilitation agreement 
implementation because it wanted to draw attention to its own food stockpiling 
policy needs. It will be senseless to battle over a remarkable achievement such 
as the TFA, using it as trade-off, by allowing India to continue with some of its 
protectionist policies in agriculture if the TFA is not properly implemented.  
 
                                                 
28 The US and India: a trade truce with a twist. Available at http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-
brics/2014/11/19/the-us-and-india-a-trade-truce-with-a-twist/  
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This calls for a major workforce by the developed nations to render 
specific technical cooperation and financial aid for emerging nations in 
renovating border customs. The gains notwithstanding, it is important to resist 
the euphoria that inevitably washes over the conclusion of a deal after almost 
two decades of fits and starts. However, the significance of the Bali package was 
to bring developing countries into the spotlight and to revive the WTO’s 
credibility.  
 
It is crucial that the BRICS do not fall to the temptation of forgetting their 
coalition. They must work together a series of measures to keep the WTO up to 
its task of helping promote development worldwide.29 Historical evidence 
shows that the BRICS need, though, to honor their commitments and effectively 
place efforts in stimulating and setting up permanent trade facilitation 
mechanisms and public policies.  
                                                 
29 Wilkinson, Rorden and Hannah, Erin and Scott, James. The WTO in Bali: What MC9 Means for 
the Doha Development Agenda and Why it Matters? (February 12, 2014). Brooks World Poverty 
Institute Working Paper No. 194. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2437422 
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